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 Renny Varghese 
Impact of an Electronic Medical Record Implementation on Drug Allergy Overrides in a 
Large Southeastern HMO Setting 
(Under the direction of Russell Toal, Associate Professor) 
 
Electronic medical records (EMRs) have become recognized as an important tool for 
improving patient safety and quality of care. Decision support tools such as alerting 
functions for patient medication allergies are a key part of reducing the frequency of 
serious medication problems.  
 
Kaiser Permanente Georgia (KPGA) implemented its EMR system in the primary care 
departments at Kaiser's twelve facilities in the greater metro Atlanta area over a six 
month period beginning in June 2005 and ending December 2005. 
 
The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of the EMR implementation on the number 
of drug allergy overrides within this large HMO outpatient setting. Research was 
conducted by comparing the rate of drug allergy overrides during pre and post EMR 
implementation. The timeline will be six months pre and post implementation. Observing 
the impact of the incidence rate of drug allergy alerts after the implementation provided 
insight into the effectiveness of EMRs in reducing contraindicated drug allergies.  
 
Results show that the incidence rate of drug allergy overrides per 1,000 filled 
prescriptions rose by a statistically significant 5.9% (ρ > 0.0002; 95% CI [-1.531, -
0.767]) following the implementation. Although results were unexpected, several factors 
are discussed as to the reason for the increase.  
 
Further research is recommended to explore trends in provider behavior, KPGA specific 
facilities and departments, and in other KP regions and non-KP healthcare settings. 
 
INDEX WORDS: electronic medical records, drug allergy overrides, patient safety, 
medication errors, decision support tools, outpatient setting, primary care, computerized 
provider order entry 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Computerized order entry systems used within electronic medical records have 
the potential to prevent medication errors and decrease adverse drug events with the use 
of clinical decision support systems which present alerts to providers. Despite the large 
volume of medications prescribed in the outpatient setting, few studies have assessed the 
impact of computerized alerts, particularly drug allergy alerts, on medication errors in an 
outpatient primary care setting. A drug allergy alert warns providers when the patient has 
had a prior reaction to a medication ordered in an electronic medical record (EMR).  A 
provider can override an alert when, for example, a patient has already shown a tolerance 
to the medication or if the alert if inappropriate.  
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) included computer-assisted decision making 
among the technologies that could improve medication safety in its call for the 
development of a Center for Patient Safety within the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (IOM, 1999). EMRs, computerized provider order entry (CPOE), and drug 
allergy alerts are included in these computer assisted decision making tools.  
Simply defined, an EMR is a longitudinal medical record in a digital format. 
EMRs support physicians by providing accessibility to complete and accurate medical 
data, alerts, reminders, clinical decision support systems, links to medical knowledge, and 
other aids.  EMRs integrate systems to communicate with all facets of a patient visit; one 
of these critical systems is CPOE.  CPOE is a prescription ordering system in which the 
provider enters medication orders directly into a computer.  Medication orders are sent 
immediately to the pharmacy, where patients may pick up their medications without a 
paper prescription.  When a prescription is ordered in CPOE and the patient has an 
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existing drug allergy to the medication ordered, a drug allergy alert appears to the 
provider in a pop-up window, as well as to the pharmacist in an external pharmacy 
system.  The provider or pharmacist has the option to change, cancel or continue with the 
order.  A drug allergy override occurs when the provider or pharmacist decide to continue 
with the original order and disregard the drug allergy alert.  
One of the acknowledged benefits of EMRs, CPOE, and drug allergy alerts is 
their ability to provide clinicians with useful information to help with decision-making 
and decreasing errors.  Improved quality, cost effectiveness and a decrease in undesirable 
medical practice variation are other anticipated outcomes in having EMR and CPOE 
systems.  The usefulness of electronic alerts has been demonstrated in numerous studies 
(Krall et al., 2001, Shah et al., 2006, van der Sijs et al., 2006).  Given their potential 
benefits, there is great incentive for system implementers to rapidly increase the number 
and coverage of alerts.  However, evidence exists that the effect of alerts may degrade 
over time and that users may ignore or override alerts (Abookire et al., 2000, Demakis et 
al, 2000).  Also, a number of related usability issues remain, including whether alerting 
systems should err on the side of sensitivity and error detection or specificity and fewer 
false positives (Kuperman et al., 2003).  In fact, there is very little known about the limits 
of alerting in the outpatient setting. 
At least 44,000 people, and perhaps as many as 98,000 people, die in hospitals 
each year as a result of medical errors that could have been prevented, according to 
estimates from two major Institute of Medicine reports: To Err is Human: Building a 
Safer Health System and Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st 
Century (IOM 1999; 2001).  Even using the lower estimate, preventable medical errors 
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exceed deaths attributable to motor-vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS.  The two 
IOM reports identified computerization of medication prescribing as an important patient 
safety strategy care in the United States.   
In 2003,  Kaiser Permanente launched a national $3 billion EMR initiative known 
as KP HealthConnect which was a large-scale effort to integrate all patient information 
linking medical, billing, scheduling and registration data for any provider to connect to 
the system nationally.  The hallmark of KP HealthConnect is that it contains an integrated 
patient database including primary care, pharmacy, laboratory, surgery, and radiology 
data.  Providers are able to send prescriptions to pharmacies electronically, refer patients 
to specialists, and share information with other providers on a real time basis.  Kaiser 
Permanente of Georgia (KPGA) implemented the KP HealthConnect system over a six 
month period in 2005 for 12 facilities in the greater Atlanta area.  Each of the 12 facilities 
has primary care and specialty departments available for patient care.  The primary care 
departments were outfitted with the KP HealthConnect system during 2005, and the 
specialty departments implemented KP HealthConnect in 2006 (KP, 2005). The focus of 
this research study only pertained to primary care department data because specialty data 
was not available.  
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of an EMR system 
implementation on drug allergy overrides in a large Southeastern health maintenance 
organization (HMO) outpatient setting.  The overarching purpose of the study was to 
determine the impact of using computerized alerts to improve medication prescribing in 
the outpatient setting, focusing mainly on allergy interactions related to medication 
orders.  
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The research question being addressed for this study was as follows: Is there a 
significant impact on the incidence of drug allergy overrides after an EMR 
implementation.  The research hypothesis was:  There is a decrease in the incidence rate 
of drug allergy overrides following the implementation of the EMR system. The null 
hypothesis (H0) was: There is no significant difference in the incidence rate of drug 
allergy overrides when pre and post implementation periods are compared. 
A literature review was conducted in Chapter II on the current issues of 
medication safety, possible solutions for medication safety, and evaluation of those 
solutions.  Chapter III presents the methodology, study design, and study setting.  
Chapter IV describes the results, drug allergy override incidence rates, and significance 
tests.  Chapter V contains observations, applicable theories, recommendations, proposed 
further research, and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The IOM report Patient Safety: Achieving a New Standard of Care states that 
medical errors can be caused by an act of commission or omission (IOM, 2004). Table 1 
defines commission and omission in more detail, as well other key terms. The focus of 
this research concentrates on acts of commission in regards to medication errors and drug 
allergy overrides.  
The literature summarized in this paper focuses on the current state of medication 
safety, the potential solutions for medication safety, and an evaluation of these solutions.  
 
 
Table 1:  Key Terms and Definitions 
 
Adverse drug 
event (ADE) 
Any injury due to medication. Examples include an allergic 
reaction occurring in a patient not known to be allergic to a given 
medication or a wrong dosage leading to injury (e.g., rash, 
confusion, or loss of function) (Bates et al., 1995a). 
Clinical Decision 
Support System 
(CDSS) 
Active knowledge systems which use two or more items of patient 
data to generate case-specific advice (Osheroff, 2005). 
Clinical Provider 
Order Entry 
(CPOE) 
A portion of a clinical information system where the provider enters 
orders for medications, procedures, laboratory or radiology tests 
directly into the computer. The system then transmits the order to 
the appropriate department to be carried out. The most advanced 
implementations of such systems also provide real-time clinical 
decision support such as drug-allergy and drug-drug interaction 
checking dosage and alternative medication suggestions, and 
duplicate therapy warnings (Osheroff, 2005). 
Commission An act of prescribing a medication that has a potentially fatal 
interaction with an allergy or another drug the patient is taking 
(IOM, 2004). These errors are the focus of this study. 
Electronic 
Medical Record 
(EMR) 
A longitudinal electronic patient record that resides in a system 
specifically designed to support users by providing accessibility to 
complete and accurate data, alerts, reminders, clinical decision 
support systems, links to medical knowledge, and other aids (IOM, 
2004). 
Health Level 7 
(HL7) 
A standard interface for exchanging and translating data between 
computer systems. HL7 facilitates the transfer of pharmacy data, 
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laboratory results, and other information between different 
computer systems (Bond et al., 1999). 
Medication error The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the 
use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.  Examples include drug 
prescription to which the patient has an allergy to, wrong dosage 
prescribed, wrong dosage administered for a prescribed medication, 
or failure to give (by the provider) or take (by the patient) a 
medication. (IOM, 2000) 
Near miss An act of commission or omission that could have harmed a patient 
but did not do so as a result of chance (e.g., the patient received a 
contraindicated drug but did not experience an ADE, prevention 
(e.g., a potentially lethal overdose was prescribed, but it was 
identified before administration), or mitigation (e.g., a lethal 
overdose was administered but discovered and offset with an 
antidote) (IOM, 2004).   
Omission The failure to prescribe medications for which there is an evidence 
base for the ability to reduce morbidity and mortality (IOM, 2004). 
Patient Safety The freedom from accidental injury due to medical care or medical 
errors (IOM, 1999) 
Pharmacy 
Information 
Management 
System (PIMS) 
An external application used by healthcare setting pharmacy 
departments to record dispensing, inventory control, and clinical 
decision support in the department. EMRs typically integrate with 
PIMS by creating and storing medication order details, dispensed 
medication details, current medications, and drug administration 
details in the EMR then sending them via HL7 code to the PIMS 
(Osheroff, 2005).  
 
Current State of Medication Safety 
Since the release of the IOM’s aforementioned reports, national attention has been 
focused to reduce medication errors and preventable adverse drug events. Hundreds of 
thousands of errors occur in the U.S health care system everyday. Fortunately, most of 
these errors result not in serious harm but in “near misses” (see Table 1). However, a 
small percentage of errors do result in adverse drug events, exacting a substantial toll in 
terms of unnecessary injury, disability, and death (IOM, 2004). 
Comprehending the full magnitude of the medication safety challenge with 
complete certainty is difficult.  The health care industry does not routinely conduct an 
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evaluation of medical errors. Studies have challenged the estimates of patient harm 
attributable to errors, as well as the methodologies used to develop them (Brennan, 2000; 
Hayward et al., 2001; McDonald et al., 2000). It is complicated to create an overview of 
error rates and costs because research designs have employed a wide variety of 
definitions, institutions, locations, time periods, and sample sizes and error rate formulas 
are not standard.  
Historically, providers have documented and delivered care using paper records 
because of their simplicity, low implementation cost, and widespread acceptance. 
However, paper records have significant disadvantages: availability to only one person at 
a time; frequent illegibility; inability to be accessed remotely or at the time and place 
needed; growing so thick as to be unwieldy; low utility and large overhead as vehicles to 
evaluate quality; and segmentation with multiple volumes and multiple storage sites 
(Bates et al., 2003a). The most serious problem with paper records is that they impede 
clinical decision support; data stored in inaccessible formats cannot incorporate or trigger 
decision support tools. 
George Halvorson, CEO of Kaiser Permanente since 2002, also states in his book 
Epidemic of Care: A Call for Safer, Better, and More Accountable Health Care that 
paper medical records are critical obstacle to increase medication safety. Halvorson et al. 
agrees that paper medical records are inadequate, inaccessible, sometimes inaccurate, and 
invariably inert. Prescriptions and work orders are too often illegible and misread. There 
are few follow-up care reminders or tracking systems for individual patients or providers. 
Halvorson et al. determines paper medical records lack in feedback, quality control, 
patient-focused overview, and information strategy. Paper medical records are kept 
 8
physically in each provider’s offices for the same patient and can not be integrated with 
each other.  This lack of coordination creates dangerous health situations when patients 
have unknown contraindicated medications from multiple providers (Halverson et al., 
2003).   
A study of a large Florida hospital evaluated errors in the EMR and traditional 
paper medical records for vital sign documentation. The results demonstrated that use of 
an EMR can reduce vital sign documentation errors by more than half compared with 
traditional manual documentation in paper charts. Researchers found the error rate for 
electronic vital signs documentation to be less than 5 percent, compared with the paper 
chart error rate of 10 percent (Gearing et al., 2006).  
A study in Germany compared paper records with the EMR system to research 
procedure coding documentation. The EMR documentation showed potential advantages 
in both quality and quantity of procedure coding: a lower number of imprecise codes and 
a higher number of appropriate codes pertaining to operations (Stausberg et al., 2003).  
Tang et al. investigated whether using an EMR affected the completeness of 
documentation and appropriateness of documented clinical decisions by evaluating 50 
progress notes where physicians used either the EMR or the traditional paper record. 
Physicians in the study who used the EMR produced more complete documentation and 
documented more appropriate clinical decisions. The expert reviewers rated the problem 
lists and medication lists in the EMR progress notes as significantly more complete than 
those in the progress notes in the paper record (1.79/2.00 vs. 0.93/2.00, P < 0.001, and 
1.75/2.00 vs. 0.91/2.00; P < 0.001, respectively). Physicians who used an EMR provided 
more evidence in their documented assessment that they had considered relevant patient 
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factors in making their decisions and documented more appropriate decisions than did 
those who used traditional paper patient records (Tang et al., 1999).  
A major study conducted by RAND Health, the nation’s largest independent 
health policy research organization, illustrated the need for medication safety solutions 
regarding recommended health care. The study established that nearly half of all adults in 
the United States fail to receive recommended health care in all settings. More 
specifically, the study found that providing the recommended care to diabetic, 
hypertensive, and heart attack patients would result in thousands of preventable deaths 
(McGlynn et al., 2003). For many of these conditions, medications are the recommended 
treatment option, and monitoring the prescription of these medications becomes an even 
more vital issue. 
However, compared with the inpatient setting, there is a substantial lack of 
information regarding medication errors in the outpatient setting. Several reasons exist 
for the relative deficiency of medication error data in the ambulatory setting. In contrast 
to inpatients, outpatients are responsible for both obtaining and administering their 
medications. Therefore, the process for medication administration is much less controlled 
(Feldstein et al., 2005).  Providers also have less regular contact with outpatients and are 
less likely to hear about all of the patient’s problems. Chart review also has limitations 
related to high costs and inadequate documentation. Therefore, previous studies of 
outpatients have relied heavily on patient report, which can be limited by patient recall 
bias (Bates et al., 2003a). 
The amount of medical errors has increased dramatically. Phillips et al. found that 
the number of deaths reportedly caused from medication errors increased by 2.5 fold 
 10
from 1983 to 1993 (Phillips et al., 1998). This percentage increase was greater than for 
almost any other cause of death, and far outpaced the increase in the number of 
prescriptions. Since this study appeared, more recent mortality data have become 
available, which indicate a continued, upward trend in deaths from prescription 
medicines (Figure 1). From 1983 to 1998 all mortality from medication errors increased 
by 243% (9856/2876), while outpatient mortality from medication errors increased by 
907% (1733/172). This 907% increase is much greater than would be expected from the 
overall increase in outpatient visits and from the increase in outpatient deaths from other 
causes (Phillips et al., 2002). 
Figure 1: Trends in U.S. deaths from prescriptions and related causes, 1983–1998* 
Phillips DP, Breder CC.(2002). Morbidity and Mortality form Medical Errors: An Increasingly Serious 
Public Health Problem Annu.Rev.Public Health. 23: 135-50 
 
*This figure is a modified and updated version of one originally presented by Phillips et al. 1998, which 
covered 1983–1993.  The causes plotted are accidents from prescriptions for which error is acknowledged; 
suicides with prescription medicines; dependent and nondependent drug abuse; prescription medicines, for 
which it is undetermined whether death resulted from purposeful or accidental acts; accidental poisonings 
by non-medicinal solid and liquid substances; accidents from prescriptions for which errors not 
acknowledged; and homicides with prescription medicines. 
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Figure 1 indicates that medication error deaths increased more steeply than did 
other deaths resulting from the misuse of solid and liquid substances. At the beginning of 
the study period the number of medication error deaths was about the same as the number 
of deaths from suicides using prescriptions. However, at the end of the study period, fatal 
accidents from medication errors far outnumbered suicides from prescriptions. In fact, 
medication error deaths outnumbered all other plotted deaths from solid and liquid 
poisoning combined (9856 versus 8924 in 1998) (Phillips et al., 2002). Aside from 
medication error deaths, only one other category markedly increased: deaths from 
prescription medicines for which it is undetermined whether the misuse is purposeful (in 
the form of suicide or homicide) or accidental. These undetermined prescription deaths 
increased by 207%.  
Figure 2 compares 20-year trends in accidental deaths from prescription 
medicines with trends in accidental deaths from aircraft, watercraft, trains, and motor 
vehicles. In 1998, the latest data-year available, the number of accidental deaths from 
prescriptions was five times the number of accidental deaths from aircraft, watercraft, and 
trains combined (10,133/1,887 = 5.37) (Phillips et al., 2002). Fatal transport accidents in 
each sector have either decreased or remained approximately level; in contrast, fatal 
prescription accidents have increased markedly. 
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Figure 2: Trends in U.S. deaths from prescriptions and from different types of 
transportation accidents, 1979–1998* 
 
 
Phillips DP, Breder CC.(2002). Morbidity and Mortality form Medical Errors: An Increasingly Serious 
Public Health Problem Annu.Rev.Public Health. 23: 135-50 
 
*To facilitate comparison of trends, mortality levels have been expressed in terms of a ratio: deaths in a given 
year/deaths in 1979. Thus, for example, the number of accidental deaths from prescription medicines in 1998 is 
nearly four times the number in 1979. The causes plotted comprise prescription and transportation accidents: 
prescriptions with acknowledged and unacknowledged error; railway; motor vehicle traffic; water transport; and 
powered aircraft. 
 
 
   The IOM Committee on Identifying and Preventing Medication Errors estimates 
that at least 1.5 million preventable ADEs occur each year in the United States (IOM, 
2006). Approximately 35% of these preventable ADEs occur in the ambulatory care 
setting. Among outpatient Medicare patients alone, Gurwitz et al. projected 530,000 
preventable ADEs and 50 ADEs per 1,000 person-years (Gurwitz et al., 2003). However, 
their approach was conservative since it did not involve direct patient contact, which 
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yields much higher rates (Gandhi et al., 2003). The number of outpatient encounters 
exceeds the number of inpatient admissions, the consequences of medical errors and the 
opportunities to improve in the outpatient setting may dwarf those in hospitals (Gurwitz 
et al., 2003). 
Most medication errors are minor, however a small portion result in an injury or 
adverse drug event (ADE). Even though only about 20% of patients react when they 
receive medications to which they have “known allergies”, the reactions can be 
devastating when they occur (Bates et al., 2000). Prescribing errors are a significant cause 
of injuries. For example, in one study of the impact of computerized physician order 
entry (CPOE, including allergy alerts), the rate of known allergy errors decreased by 56% 
(p > 0.009) (Bates et al., 1995).  Lazarou et al. conducted a meta-analysis which 
suggested more than 1 million outpatients in the United States experienced an ADE that 
required hospital admission in 1994, and 4.7% of admissions were caused by drugs 
(Lazarou et al, 1998).   
Medication errors are common in hospitals during all steps of the medication-use 
process—procuring the drug, prescribing, dispensing, administering, and monitoring the 
patient’s response.  In hospitals, they occur most frequently at the prescribing and 
administration stages (IOM, 2006). Substantial variations in error rates are found. 
Detection methods addressing all stages but not including direct observation of 
administration found a rate of 0.1 prescribing errors per patient per day in a study of 
hospital pediatric units (Kaushal et al., 2003) and a rate of 0.3 prescribing errors per 
patient per day in a study of hospital medical units (Bates et al., 1995b). A major study 
using direct observation of administration carried out at 36 different health care facilities 
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found an administration error rate of 11 percent. Since a hospital patient receives an 
average of at least ten medication doses per day, this figure suggests that on average, a 
hospital patient is subject to one administration error per day (Barker et al., 2002). 
Further, since prescribing and administration errors account for about 75 percent of 
medication errors (Leape et al., 1995), the IOM Committee on Identifying and Preventing 
Medication Errors conservatively estimates that a hospital patient is subject to at least one 
medication error per day on average (IOM, 2006).  
Beyond their cost in human lives, preventable medical errors exact other 
significant tolls such as financial expenses and loss of trust in the alert system. Current 
understanding of the costs of medication errors is highly incomplete. Most of what is 
known relates to additional health care costs associated with preventable ADEs. 
 For hospital care, the estimated additional cost of inpatient care for a preventable 
ADE incurred while in the hospital is $5,857 using 1993 cost data (Bates et al., 1997). 
Using this estimate, the IOM Committee on Identifying and Preventing Medication 
Errors calculated an annual cost of $2.3 billion in 1993 dollars or $3.5 billion in 2006 
dollars due to medication errors (IOM, 2006). For ambulatory care, the best estimate 
derives from a study conducted by Field et al. in 2005 that calculated the annual cost of 
preventable ADEs for all Medicare enrollees aged 65 and older. The cost in 2000 per 
preventable ADE was estimated at $1,983, while national annual costs were estimated at 
$887 million in 2000 dollars or $1.03 billion in 2006 dollars (Field et al., 2004).  
However, these studies neglected to examine costly medication errors in terms of 
loss of trust in the health care system by patients and diminished satisfaction by both 
patients and health professionals. Patients who experience a long hospital stay or 
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disability as a result of errors pay with physical and psychological discomfort. Health 
professionals pay with loss of morale and frustration at not being able to provide the best 
care possible. Society bears the cost of errors as well, in terms of lost worker 
productivity, reduced school attendance by children, and lower levels of population 
health status (IOM, 2004). 
 
Potential Solutions for Medication safety 
Computerized support tools are the key to solving each of the problems 
mentioned above. Along with improving the provider-patient relationship and improving 
drug information resources, electronic medication prescribing is a critical component to 
reducing errors. New computerized systems for prescribing drugs and other applications 
of information technology, such as EMRs, CPOE, and CDSS (which use drug allergy 
alerts) show promise for reducing the number of drug-related mistakes.  Studies indicate 
that paper-based prescribing is associated with high error rates (Kaushal et al., 2003).  
Electronic prescribing is safer because it eliminates problems with handwriting legibility 
and, when combined with decision-support tools can automatically alert providers to 
possible allergies, interactions and other potential problems (IOM, 2006).   
In parallel accord, Halvorson et al. states the solution to medication safety issue is 
electronic. An automated, computerized, all-inclusive electronic medical record that 
includes medical best practice protocols, interactive programming, patient-friendly 
explanations, clear communications, and standardized, automatic reminder systems is a 
critical element to reduce medication errors (Halvorson et al., 2003).  
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Converting healthcare systems from paper to electronic medical records is more 
feasible in recent years due to high speed internet connections, increasing capabilities of 
computers, and increasing use of mobile devices. Given the widely dispersed nature of 
primary care services, the Internet can now play a critical role in this transformation. 
High-speed connections from physician offices can provide web-based clinical tools. The 
speed and power of readily available computers are increasing and their costs decreasing. 
Computers and software are evolving rapidly, so mobile devices can be easily linked to 
wireless medical networks. Handheld computers can be useful sources of drug guidelines 
and other information and in the near future will likely help to extend desktop networks 
(Miller et al., 2004). 
 
Medication Error Solutions 
EMR: An EMR encompasses a “longitudinal collection of electronic health 
information for and about persons, immediate electronic access to person- and 
population-level information by authorized users, provision of knowledge and decision-
support systems that enhance the quality, safety, and efficiency of patient care and 
support for efficient processes for health care delivery" (IOM, 2004). EMRs have the 
ability to provide instant access to critical patient information, automatic access to best-
care practices and current science through embedded protocols and tutorials, tracking 
data and automatic reminders for follow-up care, automatic tracking of care and 
measuring of results to know what works and to build quality and efficiency 
improvements on that knowledge (IOM, 2006). 
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CPOE:  CPOE is a tool available in an EMR where providers can electronically 
enter instructions for the treatment of patients under his or her care. These orders are 
communicated over a computer network to the medical staff (nurses, therapists or other 
physicians) or to the departments (pharmacy, laboratory or radiology) responsible for 
fulfilling the order (Ash et al., 2004a).  Orders are not lost, legible, and immediately 
available to ancillary groups such as the pharmacy.  CPOE has been promoted by groups 
such as Leapfrog, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 
and the IOM as a mechanism to realize the objective of improving patient care quality, 
lowering health care costs, and reducing clinical errors (Mekhijian et al., 2002).   
CDSS: Clinician Decision Support Systems are utilized within CPOE and serve 
several purposes. CDSS allows real-time patient identification, checks on allergies and 
treatment conflicts, drug dose recommendations, and reviews of ADEs. A critical 
function of CDSS is the automated application of medications being checked against 
patient allergies for potential inappropriate prescribing. Physicians and nurses can review 
orders immediately for confirmation (Ash et al., 2004a).  
Drug Allergy Alert: A drug allergy alert warns providers when the patient has had 
a prior reaction, whether an allergy or a sensitivity, to a medication recorded in the EMR. 
An allergy is defined as a hypersensitive reaction to medications by the body’s immune 
system. The immune system mistakes medication as harmful and creates antibodies to 
fight it. Allergy symptoms develop when the antibodies are battling the “invading” 
medication. An allergic reaction can also arise from antibodies that been created to 
combat earlier medications. A sensitivity is a drug reaction that is non–immune-
mediated. Sensitivities (e.g., may lead to nausea or diarrhea) are less severe than allergies 
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(e.g., chest pain, anaphylaxis, death) (Bonds et al, 1999). In CPOE applications that 
maintain patients' medication and allergy lists (e.g., KP HealthConnect), ordered drugs 
can be checked against the patient's allergy list, and decision support can generate alerts 
that warn the physician of a possible allergy to the ordered drug. Physicians can either 
accept or override these alerts. Overriding alerts occurs when, for example, a patient has 
already shown tolerance to the medication or if the alert if inappropriate. 
PIMS: EMRs are repositories of patient data either entered directly or interfaced 
from external applications. One such application is a Pharmacy Information Management 
System (PIMS) that is typically used by pharmacy departments to record activity. Typical 
PIMS modules include script registration, dispensing, clinical decision support including 
interaction checking, inventory control, and management reporting. EMRs typically 
integrate with PIMS by creating and storing script details and current medications in the 
EMR then sending them via HL7 to PIMS, and by storing dispensed medication and drug 
administration details in the EMR (Bond et al., 1999).  
 
Potential benefits of solutions 
Although the full range of EMR benefits will not become clear until more systems 
are implemented and more processes computerized, EMR systems can improve 
efficiency and quality. The EMR is available 24 hours daily, 7 days a week; can be 
viewed by more than one user at a time; is available from remote locations; can nearly 
always be found; and is legible. A covering physician can rapidly get a sense of a 
patient’s problems by quickly reviewing those problems, medications, and recent notes in 
the EMR (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Snapshot of EMR* 
Bates et al. (2003b). J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2003 Jan–Feb; 10(1): 1–10 
*Snapshot for a typical patient. When a primary care provider sees a patient, the EMR typically provides a 
snapshot of key information, including but not limited to the patient’s demographics, problem list, 
medications, and health maintenance information. These and other data can be used to generate a set of 
reminders, which improve the likelihood that a patient will actually receive needed care. Without such 
decision support, it is extremely hard to rapidly determine what actions are due. 
 
Even more than improving efficiency, quality may be the greatest benefit of 
computerization. The current volume of clinical data required for practice is difficult for 
providers to retain given the broad scope of primary care (Miller et al., 2004). As 
information becomes obsolete, it is not refreshed, and new knowledge cannot be 
integrated. Thus, physicians take “short cuts,” using clinical experience and heuristics 
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rather than pursuing organized investigations (Bates et al., 2003b). Therefore, 
computerization of alerts, reminders, and prevention guidelines benefits patients. 
Computerization of medication prescribing improves safety; in one study of 
inpatients, the medication error rate was reduced by more than 80% (Bates et al., 1999a). 
Communication between patients and providers represents a particular problem in 
outpatient care (Gandhi et al., 1998) and computerization may be helpful in this domain. 
Another quality improvement benefit of computerized prescribing comes from the 
monitoring and tracking of ADEs, abnormal laboratory results, and ensuring that 
appropriate patient follow-up occurs. Moreover, EMRs can be linked with public health 
surveillance, which may be extremely important in emergencies such as a bioterrorism 
attack or an epidemic (Kuperman et al., 2003). EMRs have important benefits for 
specialty care as well. For example, poor communication plagues the current referral 
process (Feldstein et al., 2005) and could be ameliorated through computerization. Poorly 
coordinated care can lead to ADEs, unnecessary tests and treatments, and higher costs.  
 
Legislation 
The 2001 IOM report called for major federal investment in information 
technology as crucial to achieving necessary changes, such as “elimination of most 
handwritten clinical data by the end of the decade.” Better use of information technology 
is essential to providing better care at lower cost (IOM, 2001).  
The President, by Executive Order, established the position of National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (HIT). The National Coordinator for HIT 
is the chief advisor to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Mike Leavitt) to lead 
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the actions needed to meet the President’s call for widespread availability of secure, 
interoperable health IT. In November 2004, the National Coordinator issued a request for 
information to gather public input on the development of a Nationwide Health 
Information Network (NHIN). In analyzing the more than 500 responses in early 2005, 
the Office of the National Coordinators for Health IT (ONC) found that a lack of uniform 
standard was a key obstacle to the success of a NHIN (HHS, 2007). 
In 2005, Secretary Leavitt announced the formation of the American Health 
Information Community (AHIC), a federal advisory committee made up of public and 
private sector leaders who represent a broad spectrum of healthcare stakeholders. The 
AHIC was established to make recommendations to the Secretary on how to accelerate 
adoption of interoperable electronic health IT in a smooth, market-led way (HHS, 2007).  
Also in 2005, the ONC awarded nine contracts to conduct work in several key 
areas of the health IT initiative. Included in these contracts are the Health Information 
Technology Standards Panel, Certification Commission for Healthcare Information 
Technology, Anti-Fraud for Electronic Health Records, NHIN, Adoption of Electronic 
Health Records, and Clinical Decision Support (HHS, 2007).  
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-41) was 
signed into law by President Bush on July 29, 2005.  It encourages healthcare providers 
to promote a "culture of safety" through their voluntary submission of medical errors 
data. The data would be used for educational and research initiatives and analyses 
supported by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The law 
promotes voluntary provider participation by creating a network of HHS-certified 
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"patient safety organizations" (PSOs) that would collect and evaluate medical errors data 
(P.L. 109-41, Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005). 
In 2006, AHIC delivered its first set of recommendations to Secretary Leavitt. 
EMRs were included in the recommendations as a work group area that the Secretary 
officially accepted. AHIC recommends creating standardized, secure records of past and 
current laboratory test results that is accessible by health professionals. He also accepted 
the AHIC’s recommendation for federal healthcare delivery systems, which provide 
direct patient care, to develop an adoption plan to integrate the interoperability standards 
into their software systems by December, 2007. The President issued another Executive 
Order in 2006 committing federal departments and agencies that purchase and deliver 
health care to require the use of health IT that is based on interoperability standards 
recognized by the Secretary of HHS (HHS, 2007). 
Four prototype architectures for a NHIN were delivered in January, 2007. These 
prototypes were developed with functional requirements and security and business 
models for health information exchange. Also in 2007, the AHIC formed workgroups 
(The Confidentiality, Privacy and Security Workgroup, The Quality Workgroup, The 
Personalized Health Care Workgroup) to make recommendations to the Secretary (HHS, 
2007). 
In June 2007, JCAHO announced the 2008 National Patient Safety Goals and 
related requirements for each of its accreditation programs. The goals and requirements, 
recently approved by the Joint Commission’s Board of Commissioners, apply to the 
nearly 15,000 Joint Commission-accredited and certified health care organizations and 
programs, including Kaiser Permanente (JCAHO, 2007).  
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Major changes in this sixth annual issuance of National Patient Safety Goals 
include a new requirement to take specific actions to reduce the risks of patient harm 
associated with the use of anticoagulant therapy (the use of certain drugs to prevent 
formation of harmful blood clots). The new anticoagulant therapy requirement addresses 
the widely-acknowledged patient safety problem and becomes a key element of the goal: 
Improve the safety of using medications.  It is applicable to hospitals, critical access 
hospitals, ambulatory care and office-based surgery settings, and home care and long 
term care organizations.  The foregoing new requirements have a one-year phase-in 
period that includes defined milestones.  Full implementation is targeted for January 2009 
(JCAHO, 2007).  
 
Evaluation of solutions 
EMRs, CPOE, CDSS, and PIMS are integral components to make the medication 
safety strategy a realization (Bates et al., 1998; Raschke et al., 1998). EMRs have been 
shown to integrate data, save time, increase compliance, reduce medical errors, and 
improve the quality of health care delivery (Bates et al 1998; 1999; Evans et al 1998).  
Several EMR systems are available in the healthcare market (Table 2). To gauge 
the extent of health IT use among U.S. hospitals and to better understand the barriers to 
further adoption, the American Hospital Association (AHA) surveyed hospitals in fall 
2006. More than 1,500 community hospitals- about 31 percent of all U.S. community 
hospitals- responded to the survey. Over two-thirds of hospitals (68 percent) had either 
fully or partially implemented EMRs in 2006. Hospitals reported dramatic increases in 
the use of computerized alerts to prevent negative drug interactions. In 2006, 51 percent 
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of hospitals were using real-time drug interaction alerts, up from 23 percent in 2005 
(AHA, 2007).   
 
Table 2: Twenty-six Outpatient EMR Systems 
Charting Plus NextGen 
ChartWare O-HEAP 
Clinical Works Module (ASP) Partner 
ComChart PEARL 
DOCU*MENTOR Dossier Physician Practice Solution 
Dr. Notes Program Physician Practice Solution (ASP) 
ENTITY PowerMed EMR 
EpicCare Practice Partner Patient Records 
HealthMatics QDClinical 
Health Probe Patient Information Manager SOAPware 
Logician TopsChart (ASP) 
Logician Internet (ASP) VersaForm CPR 
MedicWare EMR Welford Chart Notes 
Bates, DW et al. (2003b). A Proposal for Electronic Medical Records in U.S. Primary Care. J Am Med 
Inform Assoc, 10(1), 1-10. 
 
The estimated net benefit from using an EMR for a 5-year period was $86,400 per 
provider. Benefits accrue primarily from savings in drug expenditures, improved 
utilization of radiology tests, better capture of charges, and decreased billing errors 
(Wang et al, 2003).  Even though U.S. medical care is the world’s most costly, its 
outcomes are mediocre compared with other industrialized nations. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) report ranking the world’s health systems placed the United States 
37th in 2000 (WHO, 2000). 
 Both Australia and England have implemented highly successful national 
programs to promote the use of EMRs in primary care (Kidd et al., 2000; Purves et al., 
1999). Other countries, including New Zealand and the Netherlands, have also achieved 
substantial success (Thakurdas et al., 1996).  
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 In terms of speed, Australia’s results have been most dramatic. In May 2000, 70 
percent of primary care practices stated that the majority of their physicians were using a 
computer in their examination rooms to order most of their prescriptions, compared with 
only 15 percent of primary care providers reporting computer use for any purpose in 
October 1997. Australia achieved this transition by providing primary care providers with 
financial support to help purchase a computer, supporting system implementation for 
those who needed it, and offering incentives for providers to submit claims electronically 
(Kidd et al., 2000). 
England has made greater progress, albeit more slowly. Ninety-eight percent of 
primary care providers have access to an EMR on their desktop. Nearly all use it for 
prescription refills, and 30 percent report that their practices are paperless. Only three 
vendors supply these EMR systems and accreditation is required for the sale of systems. 
An application called Prodigy interacts with these applications and provides evidence-
based decision support (Purves et al., 1999). 
Each of these countries made a national investment in a coordinating group to 
develop a strategic framework and identify standards. Development of the actual EMRs 
has been carried out by private vendors, who have benefited from having a common set 
of goals and standards. In addition, each country developed incentives for providers to 
make the transition from paper to electronic records. 
Many effective error prevention strategies are available, especially for hospital 
care. In the hospital setting, there is evidence for the effectiveness of computerized order 
entry with clinical decision-support systems (Bates et al., 1998), for clinical decision-
support systems themselves (Evans et al., 1998), and for pharmacist participation on 
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hospital rounds (Leape et al., 1999). Involving pharmacists in the management of 
medications in nursing homes and ambulatory care also shows promise (IOM, 2006), but 
requires additional study.  
While computerized prescribing applications are commercially available, these 
systems may not be as effective for improving safety if providers override clinically 
important alerts. Recent findings show that CPOE used in conjunction with basic CDSS, 
such as drug allergy alerts decreases the likelihood of serious medication errors (Bond et 
al., 2001). CPOE has been shown to be an effective technique for reducing potential 
medication errors. Two studies found that CPOE reduced medication errors from by 55 
percent and 81 percent in an inpatient setting (Bates et al., 1998; 1999).  In 1998, Bates et 
al. studied a large tertiary care hospital, comparing a baseline to after a CPOE 
implementation. The study found that serious medication errors decreased 55 percent, 
from 10.7 events per 1000 patient-days to 4.86 events per 1000 (P=.01) (Bates et al., 
1998). In 1999, Bates et al. studied three medical units for seven to ten-week periods in 
four different years. The study found medication error rate fell 81 percent, from 142 per 
1,000 patient-days in the baseline period to 26.6 per 1,000 patient-days in the final period 
(P < 0.0001) (Bates et al., 1999).    
A common issue that comes along with implementing CDSS and drug allergy 
alerting is overrides. Drug allergy alerts can provide substantial aid to providers when 
given at the appropriate time and displaying an accurate alert message. These alerts can 
modify ordering behavior especially when presented at key times such as when 
physicians are writing orders (Bates et al., 1998, Bates et al., 1999, Overhage et al., 
1997). 
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However, drug alert overriding is a common phenomenon. Overriding alerts occurs 
when, for example, a patient has already shown tolerance to the medication or if the alert 
if inappropriate. 
A study reviewing the literature on physician response to drug alerts found drug 
alerts are overridden in 49% to 96% of cases (van de Sijs et al., 2006).Low-level (non-
critical) alerts appear to be overridden more often than high-level alerts (serious alerts), 
but this could not be completely confirmed in a study with three severity levels of alerts 
(Abookire et al., 2000) However, alert levels can not be compared between studies 
because standardization of alert levels is absent. None of these quantitative studies 
discusses the relationship between different levels of alerts and override rates.   
These studies illustrate that drug allergy overrides have become increasingly 
widespread. However, several factors give rise to the explanation of the high rates of 
overriding: incomplete or inaccurate clinical data, lack of standardization, alert fatigue, 
and unclear alerts. 
Data shows that currently there is great deal of missing information in primary 
care settings (Smith et al., 2005). Incomplete and inaccurate clinical information may 
lead to redundant or conflicting alerts, and subsequent drug allergy alert overrides. 
Besides human error (e.g., the admitting provider not entering any or the correct drug 
allergy information), a patient’s complete drug use and allergy profiles may be 
incomplete due to discontinuous enrollment of members or patient confidentiality 
protections. When health plan members disenroll, their prescription drug and medical 
claims history may not be transferred to the new health plan. Disenrollment in managed 
care plans can lead to precarious gaps in prescription drug claims and drug use history. 
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Patients with sensitive diseases (e.g., AIDS, behavioral health issues) may have 
confidentiality protections on their records that may restrict access to what is deemed 
‘sensitive information’. These confidentiality protections may fragment pharmacy data 
from other relevant data required for an effective pharmacy system. This disintegration of 
pharmacy claims data raises the possibility of potentially preventable adverse outcomes 
(Fulda et al., 2004).  
Maintaining accurate allergy lists can be difficult because there may not be clear 
distinctions between allergies and sensitivities, and there is no general consensus on 
whether both should be included in allergy lists. In addition, neither the specificity of 
alerting algorithms nor the relative effectiveness of different methods of alerting (e.g., 
alerts that interrupt workflow vs. those that display information, but do not interrupt) has 
been elucidated fully.  Hsieh et al. cited the reason for increased override rates was highly 
inclusive drug-class and drug cross-reactivity mapping, which generates a large number 
of allergy alerts for drugs with only slight potential to cause an allergic reaction. Hsieh et 
al. suggests a drug allergy checking process with more rigorous constructs which that 
concentrate on the difference between high potential for an allergic reaction versus only a 
slight potential is needed. Policies requiring physicians to renew certain drugs for the 
same patient multiple times, causing many redundant alerts to be generated, were also 
cited (Hsieh et al., 2004).  
The most common reason for overriding was alert fatigue. Alert fatigue is caused 
when providers believe that an alert is not serious, irrelevant, or shown repeatedly 
(Magnus et al., 2002; Feldstein et al., 2004). Alert fatigue has not been thoroughly 
studied, but is described as the mental state that is the result of too many alerts 
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consuming time and mental energy. Alert fatigue can cause important alerts to be ignored 
along with clinically unimportant ones (Peterson et al., 2001). Both inaccurate data and 
highly inclusive drug allergy reactivity lexicons can lead to superfluous alerts. Numerous 
alerts arising from trivial or false positives add to an already heavy workload. Receiving 
too many alerts can result in slowing the provider down rendering the alert ineffectual 
(Feldstein et al., 2004).  
 Alerts that are unclear, too extensive, complicated to interpret, and where medical 
consequences are not apparent are overridden frequently (Magnus et al., 2002, Feldstein 
et al., 2004). Twenty-two percent of general practitioners admitted to overriding drug 
alerts without checking the validity of the alert (Magnus et al., 2002). In a study on 
corollary orders, the rationale not to accept reminders included inappropriate orders, 
disagreement with the guidelines, and lack of time (Overhage et al., 1997). Lack of 
comprehension about significance of the warnings also hinders accurate and efficient 
management of drug alerts (Hsieh et al., 2004). 
 Weingart et al. assessed the appropriateness of alerts and uncovered that 39% of 
the alerts were false positives. Reviewers concurred with providers' decisions in 95.6% of 
cases where providers overrode a legitimate alert (Weingart et al., 2003).  Oppenheim et 
al. conducted a study to determine the error frequency made by trainees for patients with 
renal impairment and the frequency of alerts to correct these orders to providers. 
Oppenheim et al. found that 48% of the true positive alerts were overridden by providers 
(Oppenheim et al., 2002).  
Overriding drug allergy alerts may result in the direct effect of ADEs or the 
indirect effect of decreased user acceptance. The direct effect of overridden alerts on 
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safety is mentioned in three publications. Adverse events were observed in 2.3%, 2.5%, 
and 6% of the overridden alerts, respectively, in studies with override rates of 57%, 90%, 
and 80% (Peterson et al., 2001; Weingart et al., 2003; Hsieh et al., 2004). ADEs were 
preventable in 0.8% for the Weingart et al. study and none of the overrides for the Hsieh 
et al. study (Weingart et al., 2003; Hsieh et al., 2004). 
Overriding drug allergy alerts may also indirectly weaken medication safety. Too 
many alerts with low credibility may cause physicians to override important alerts along 
with unimportant ones. Hospitals, in turn, have been shown to turn off an entire 
collection of alerts, including relevant ones which decrease user acceptance and trust in 
the alerting system (Payne et al., 2002; Magnus et al., 2002; Ash et al., 2004b).  
One study found that errors and lost improvement opportunities result from the 
failure of clinical laboratory and pharmacy information systems to effectively 
communicate (Schiff et al., 2003) with one another. Evans et al. found ADE rates were 
reduced with the implementation of ADE surveillance, alerts to pharmacists about drug 
allergies, standardization of antibiotic administration rates, and physician notification 
about ADEs (Evans et al, 1998). Another study found that involving clinical pharmacists 
in reviewing drug orders significantly reduced the potential harm resulting from errant 
medication orders (Folli et al., 1987). Greater improvement in reducing medication errors 
is possible through implementation of CPOE with real time decision support 
incorporating linked laboratory and pharmacy data. 
It should be noted that recent studies have identified implementation problems 
and the unintended occurrence of new types of errors with these computerized 
approaches (e.g., pharmacy inventory displays of available drug doses being mistaken for 
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the usual or minimally effective doses). Avoiding these problems requires addressing 
business and cultural issues before such strategies are implemented and aggressively 
solving technological problems during the implementation process. Regulatory issues 
must also be addressed for electronic transmission of prescriptions to be practical (IOM, 
2006). 
 The following chapter will discuss the methodology and procedures of this 
research study to determine the impact of an EMR implementation on drug allergy 
overrides in an HMO setting. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of an EMR system 
implementation on drug allergy overrides in a large Southeastern HMO outpatient setting. 
The overarching purpose of the study was to determine the impact of using computerized 
alerts to improve the prescribing of medications in the outpatient setting.  The study 
focused on allergy interactions related to medication orders.  
The research question being addressed for this study was:  Is there a significant 
impact in the incidence of drug allergy overrides after an EMR implementation?  The 
research hypothesis was: There is a decrease in the incidence rate of drug allergy 
overrides following the implementation of the EMR system. The null hypothesis (H0) 
was:  There is no significant difference in the incidence rate of drug allergy overrides 
when pre and post implementation periods are compared. 
  
Research Design 
A retrospective cross-sectional study was conducted to determine the impact of an 
EMR implementation on drug allergy overrides at KPGA. The impact of an EMR 
implementation on drug allergy overrides was measured by calculating an incidence rate 
of drug allergy overrides per 1,000 prescriptions. The incidence rate was assessed using 
the total number of drug allergy overrides and prescriptions filled. Comparing the rates of 
drug allergy overrides per 1,000 prescriptions pre and post intervention (defined in Study 
Setting) provided a measure of the efficacy of the EMR intervention.  
The research variables included: 
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1. Total count of drug allergy overrides prior to the KP HealthConnect 
implementation, 
2. Total count of drug allergy overrides following the KP HealthConnect 
implementation, 
3. Total count of prescriptions prior to the KP HealthConnect 
implementation, 
4. Total count of prescriptions following the KP HealthConnect 
implementation, 
5. Incidence of drug allergy overrides per 1000 prescriptions prior to KP 
HealthConnect, implementation and, 
6. Incidence of drug allergy overrides per 1000 visits following the KP 
HealthConnect implementation. 
The comparative incidence rates were calculated by dividing the total number of 
drug allergy overrides by the total number of prescriptions filled. This calculation 
garnered an incidence rate for both the pre and post implementation periods in the format 
of drug allergy overrides per 1,000 prescriptions.  
For the purposes of this research study, “prescription” was defined as a written 
medical order by a provider to a pharmacist for treatment to be provided to the patient. 
“Total prescriptions” was defined as total prescriptions that were filled within the KPGA 
Pharmacy department within either the pre or post implementation period (not including 
prescription refills). The same definition of total prescription was used for both the pre 
and post periods.  
A “drug allergy override” was defined as a provider’s or pharmacist’s action to 
override a drug allergy alert. In this research study, provider drug allergy overrides (from 
KP HealthConnect) were not available, therefore only pharmacist drug allergy override 
data was accessible and utilized (from PIMS).  Drug allergy overrides are discussed in 
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further detail in Chapter IV. The definitional rules of what constituted an override were 
confirmed as identical for the pre and post implementation in discussions with the KPGA 
Pharmacy Drug Informatics Specialist.  
A Z-test was used to calculate the significance of the pre and post implementation 
incidence rates. The pre and post implementation incidence rates were independent 
proportions. The Z-test compared the significance of the difference between the two 
independent proportions to find if the difference between the two proportions was large 
enough to be statistically significant.  The Z-test calculation was as follows: 
,  
 
where proportions and  were the incidence rates for the pre and post 
implementation periods, respectively and n1 and n2 were the total prescriptions for the pre 
and post implementation periods, respectively.  A confidence level of 95% (α = .05) and 
a two-tail probability were used for this study. The confidence interval (CI) was 
calculated using the following formula for the 95% significance level: 
. 
The null hypothesis (H0) can only be rejected at level  if and only if the 100(1- )% 
confidence interval does not contain 0. 
The data used in this research qualified as a de-identified data set. None of the 18 
HIPAA Privacy Rule identifiers were included. The study used secondary data collection 
to create a de-identified data set, which used the total amount of both drug allergy alerts 
and prescriptions. Using total amounts for analysis purposes limited any risk for patient 
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identification. There were not any physical, psychological, social, or legal risks to 
participants during the course of this research study. This study was approved by the 
Institutional Review Boards at Kaiser Permanente of Georgia and Georgia State 
University. 
 The setting for the study and data collection methods undertaken at KPGA is 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
Study Setting 
Kaiser Permanente (KP) is a national nonprofit multi-specialty HMO that 
provides care to 8.4 million members in nine states and the District of Columbia. KP is 
accredited by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), which has been 
recognized as the gold standard in accreditation (NCQA, 2005). 
Kaiser Permanente of Georgia (KPGA) owns and operates twelve medical 
facilities throughout the 21-county Atlanta area, serving more than a quarter of a million 
members. The research data utilized in this study was included data from all twelve 
medical facilities.   
A retrospective cross-sectional study was conducted using pre and post periods 
for the KP HealthConnect implementation. Twelve facilities which implemented KP 
HealthConnect in their primary care departments did so over a six month period (Table 
3). The TownPark office was the first facility to implement the system June 2005. The 
Forsyth, Brookwood, and Alpharetta offices were the final facilities to implement the 
system in December 2005.  
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Table 3:  Facility Timeline (Pre, Implementation, and Post) 
 
FACILITY PRE 
PERIOD 
START* 
PRE 
PERIOD 
END 
IMPLEMENT
-ATION 
DATE** 
POST 
PERIOD 
START*** 
POST 
PERIOD 
END 
TownPark 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 6/26/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Southwood/ 
Southwood 
Specialty 
12/1/2004 5/31/2005 8/7/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Panola 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 9/25/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Glenlake 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 9/25/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Henry 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 10/16/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Crescent 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 10/16/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Cascade 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 11/6/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Gwinnett 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 11/27/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Cumberland 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 11/27/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Forsyth 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 12/18/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Brookwood 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 12/18/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
Alpharetta 12/1/2004 5/31/2005 12/18/2005 3/1/2006 8/31/2006
 
 
*The Pre Period includes the six months prior to the first facility’s (TownPark) implementation of 
the KP HealthConnect system 
**The Implementation date was the date that KP HealthConnect was implemented at that facility 
***The Post Period includes the six months after the final facilities were implemented with KP 
HealthConnect. The six month post period begins after a two month period to account for the 
learning curve. 
 
For the purposes of this research study, the pre implementation period was 
defined to be the six months prior to the first facility’s implementation date (12/1/04 – 
5/31/05). The actual implementation of KP HealthConnect for all primary care 
departments took place over the six months (6/1/05 – 12/31/05). The post implementation 
period was defined as six months following the final facility’s implementation (3/1/06 – 
8/31/06). The post implementation period began two months following the final facility’s 
implementation date. Based on discussions with KPGA personnel, the decision was made 
to begin the post implementation period two months following the final facility’s 
implementation to account for a learning curve of providers and staff. 
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KPGA specialty departments (e.g., OB/GYN, Podiatry, Behavioral Health, etc.) 
implemented KP HealthConnect in 2006.  However, specialty department data was not 
available during the course of this research study. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
study, only primary care department data was utilized.  Also, the total drug allergy 
overrides and the total prescriptions filled data was not facility specific; instead the data 
was only available as an aggregate number for the twelve facilities.  
 The target population included the total number of prescriptions and drug allergy 
overrides during the pre and post periods.  Therefore, the inclusion criteria for this study 
were the total number of drug allergy overrides and the total number of prescriptions 
during the pre and the post implementation periods for all primary care departments. 
Exclusion criteria included the drug allergy overrides and prescriptions which fell outside 
of pre and post implementation periods.  
  
Data Collection 
The following procedures were used to collect data immediately described in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
All data used in this study came from two databases, PIMS and a Paradox 
relational database, that were housed within KPGA. PIMS is a system that records all 
pharmacy related data (e.g., prescription orders, dispensing information, inventory 
control, clinical decision support information including drug allergy override data). 
Prescription data was housed on a national repository server, along with all 
patient visit data, which was not available for the authors use. Therefore, a Paradox 
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relational database housed at KPGA was created for the purposes of this study by a 
KPGA data technician, containing only pre and post prescription implementation data.  
Drug allergy override data was housed in the PIMS. Data used in this study was 
abstracted by the KPGA Pharmacy Drug Informatics Specialist, based on the following 
two criteria:  
1. Drug allergy overrides that occurred within the pre and post 
implementation date parameters 
2. Drug allergy overrides that occurred within the primary care 
departments of the 12 KPGA facilities 
 
For the purposes of this study, drug allergy data was available in the format of two text 
files, one for pre and post implementation date parameters. The text files were then 
converted into two de-identified Access databases by a KPGA data technician. Included 
in the de-identified Access files were two fields: a generic label of “Per Pharmacist ID” 
and “Drug Allergy Overrides”. The actual pharmacist ID was not included in the Access 
file, only the number of drug allergy overrides per day. The “Drug Allergy Overrides” 
field was the count of drug allergy alerts per day. Each line of the pre and post Access 
files were defined as the number of drug allergy overrides per pharmacist ID per day. To 
obtain the total amount of drug allergy overrides, two queries were run on both the pre 
and post implementation files. The total number of drug allergy overrides that met the 
criteria from PIMS was 41,411 records, pre and post implementation.   
Prescription data was housed in a stand-alone internal Paradox relational database 
created for the purposes of this study. Data used in this study were abstracted by the 
KPGA data technician, based on the following two criteria: 
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1. Total prescriptions filled within the pre and post implementation date 
parameters. 
2. Total prescriptions prescribed through primary care departments and filled at 
KPGA facility pharmacies. 
For the purposes of this research study, a de-identified data set was created in two 
Paradox relational databases including only drug prescriptions filled within the pre and 
post implementation date parameters. Included in the de-identified Paradox database was 
the “Presc_Fill_Com” field, which was created by the KPGA data technician to capture 
the number of prescriptions per patient per day. Patient names or HRNs were not be 
included, only the number of prescriptions per patient per day. To obtain the total number 
of prescriptions filled at KPGA pharmacies during the pre and post implementation 
period, two queries were run on both the pre and post implementation databases. The 
total number of prescriptions filled pre and post implementation that met the criteria from 
the Paradox relational database was 2.07 million.    
Incidence rates were calculated by dividing the total number of drug allergy 
overrides by the total number of prescriptions filled. This calculation garnered an 
incidence rate for both the pre and post implementation periods in the format of drug 
allergy overrides per 1,000 prescriptions. The incidence rates were then compared 
between the pre and post implementation periods to measure the impact of the EMR 
implementation. If the incidence rate was higher for pre period verses the post period, 
then the EMR implementation on drug allergy overrides would be considered a positive 
impact. If the incidence rate was lower for the pre period verses the post period, then the 
EMR implementation on drug allergy overrides would be considered a negative impact.  
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 The significance of the difference between the two incidence rates was 
established using a Z-test. Microsoft Excel was used to calculate the Z-test formula and 
the Confidence Interval at the 95% significance level (see Chapter III, Research Design).  
All data files were available only on the I drive (KP employees accessible only), 
de-identified, and password protected. Only the investigators had access to the password. 
Recognizing the policy against using any media to copy sensitive PHI for use outside of 
Kaiser Permanente grounds, data analysis and research was conducted on a KP 
workstation.   
The following chapter reports the findings of this research study using the 
methodology and procedures detailed above.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter will detail the KPGA drug allergy override workflow pre and post 
KP HealthConnect implementation, followed by the final results garnered from this 
research study. 
 
Pre Implementation Workflow 
Prior to the KP HealthConnect implementation, drug allergy overrides were only 
managed by the clinical pharmacists when prescriptions were manually ordered by 
providers on paper medical records. PIMS was implemented prior to KP HealthConnect 
and was used to capture all medication orders by manual data entry.  
For example, a provider ordered a medication for a patient manually and misses a 
drug allergy contraindication with the ordered prescription. The prescription would be 
manually entered into PIMS. The pharmacist would receive a drug allergy alert for the 
patient’s medication order in PIMS, but an action would be required to fill the 
prescription. The pharmacist had three options: cancel the order, choose another option to 
fill the prescription, or override the drug allergy alert and continue with the original 
order.  The pharmacist may contact the provider to decide to cancel or change the order 
and then the pharmacist may make the appropriate changes to the medication order. If the 
provider and pharmacist decide to override the drug allergy, an override reason, which is 
typed in a free text field, would be required to continue with the order. 
  Except override reasons, the remainder of the drug allergy override data (e.g., 
patient data, provider and pharmacist ID, medication ordered) would be recorded within 
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PIMS.  Thus, drug allergy override reasons were not obtainable for analysis within this 
study. A total of the de-identified drug allergy overrides was available to be used during 
the course of this study.  
Drug renewals were not included in the data utilized for this study.  The study did 
not have access to complete prescription data.  Eight percent of prescriptions were filled 
outside of KPGA pharmacies and these were not included as in the total prescriptions 
filled.  
 
Post Implementation Workflow 
Once KP HealthConnect implemented its computer based order entry system 
(CPOE), providers had a decision support system (CDSS) to aid in the detection of drug 
allergy contraindicated prescriptions.  In this post period, the patient’s medication order 
was reviewed by two systems (CPOE and PIMS) compared to the one system (PIMS) in 
the pre period.  
 The CPOE tool provided clinical-decision support to providers by means of alerts 
driven by CDSS.  CDSS relied on multiple sources of routinely collected data such as 
patient demographic characteristics, medical problem lists, previous diagnoses, vital 
signs, active inpatient orders, previous pharmacy records, and coded radiology results. 
Every patient must have drug allergies entered by the admitting providers in order entry; 
this entry was coded into an allergy table. The allergy table contained the drug 
ingredients, which are activated as possible allergens. For a drug-allergy checking system 
to function, patient allergy data must have been stored prior to medication ordering. The 
important attributes of a patient allergy record were the medication or ingredient to which 
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the patient is allergic, as well as the reaction that the patient experiences when exposed to 
the allergen (e.g., rash, nausea, anaphylaxis, etc.).  Figure 4 shows an example of an 
allergy documentation screen. 
 
Figure 4: Allergy documentation screenshot 
 
Kuperman GJ et al. (2003). Effective drug-allergy checking: methodological and operational issues.  J Bio 
Inform(36), 70-79. 
 
Every subsequent medication ordered during the admission is crosschecked 
against the allergen tables for potential allergy.  Allergies are best represented as 
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ingredients. Most medications contain only one active ingredient (e.g., penicillin) so 
documenting that the patient is allergic to the medication penicillin is the same as stating 
that the patient is allergic to the ingredient penicillin. Some medications contain more 
than one active ingredient (e.g., Bactrim contains trimethoprim and sulfmethoxazole). If 
the patient is stated to be allergic to ‘‘Bactrim,’’ many applications will represent that as 
an allergy to the ingredient sulfmethoxazole and an allergy to the ingredient trimethoprim 
(Morimoto et al., 2004). If there is a documented allergy to a specified medication and a 
medication with a known allergy is ordered, an alert is generated on the CPOE screen.  
An example of a drug-allergy alert screen is shown in Figure 5.  
A drug-allergy alert screen displayed details of the alert (i.e., the drug being 
ordered, the drug to which the patient is allergic, and the patient’s documented reaction 
that occurred when the patient was exposed to this drug in the past) and offered two 
options: cancel the medication being ordered (i.e., ‘‘accept’’ the alert), or continue with 
the prescription despite the alert (i.e., keep the medication, or ‘‘override’’ the alert). 
Figure 5 displays a drug-allergy interaction from the Brigham and Women’s Hospital 
CPOE application.  However, KP HealthConnect has a third option available to change 
the order included in the CPOE application. 
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Figure 5:  Drug allergy alert screenshot* 
Kaushal et al. (2003). Effects of Computerized Physician Order Entry and Clinical Decision Support Systems on 
Medication Safety: A Systematic Review. Arch Intern Med, 163(12), 1409-1416. 
 
*The patient has a documented allergy to ‘‘penicillins’’ and the medication being ordered is ampicillin. If 
the physician chooses to ‘‘keep’’ the order, he will be presented with a free text field in which to enter the 
reason for the override. 
 
 
If the provider decided to cancel the order, the prescription will not route to PIMS or 
become part of the patient’s EMR.  If the provider decided to change the order, they can 
make the appropriate changes and only the altered prescription will route to PIMS (see 
Figure 6).  If the provider decided to override the drug allergy alert, a reason must be 
typed in a free text field to continue with the order. The providers’ reasons for overriding 
allergy alerts were attached to medication orders so that pharmacists and nurses could 
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consider them when double-checking the orders for drug allergy interactions before 
dispensing and administration.  Before the prescription was filled by the pharmacy, the 
order would still process through PIMS and the pharmacist would have the same options 
as detailed during the pre implementation period.   
 
Figure 6: Alternative medication alert in CPOE screenshot * 
 
Feldstein et al., (2005). Decision Support System Design and Implementation for Outpatient Prescribing: 
The Safety in Prescribing Study. AHRQ Publication 050021, 1-4. 55 
 
*Allergy documentation screen from Massachusetts General Hospital order entry application. Note coded 
pick lists of common allergies and reactions. Allergies not appearing on the list can be selected by choosing 
‘‘other.’’ A selector function appears that lets user select from a much larger coded list. 
 
 
 47
Data was not available on the provider’s response to the CPOE drug allergy alerts 
(e.g., whether the provider cancelled, changed, or overrode the orders and override 
reasons).  Thus, PIMS drug allergy override data was used as the numerator in the 
calculation of the comparative incidence rates for the pre and post implementation 
periods. Drug renewals were not included in the data utilized for this study.  The study 
did not have access to complete prescription data.  Eight percent of prescriptions were 
filled outside of KPGA pharmacies and these were not included as in the total 
prescriptions filled.  
 
Findings 
 The review of the Paradox database (prescription data) from the pre 
implementation period revealed a total of 1,011,722 filled prescriptions.  The review of 
the PIMS database (drug allergy override data) revealed that there were 19,652 instances 
of drug allergy overrides from the pre implementation period. The incidence rate for the 
pre implementation period was obtained by dividing the total number of drug allergy 
overrides by the total number of prescriptions filled. Therefore, the pre implementation 
period incidence rate was 19.42 drug allergy overrides per 1,000 prescriptions (Table 4).  
The review of the Paradox database from the post implementation period revealed 
a total of 1,057,849 filled prescriptions. The review of the PIMS database revealed that 
there were 21,759 instances of drug allergy overrides for the post implementation period. 
Utilizing the same incidence rate calculation as above, the post implementation period 
incidence rate was 20.57 drug allergy overrides per 1,000 prescriptions.  
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TABLE 4: Pre and Post KP HealthConnect Implementation Data 
         Pre Period        Post Period 
Date Parameters 12/1/04-5/31/05 3/1/06-8/31/06
Total drug allergy overrides 19,652 21,759
Total prescriptions filled 1,011,722 1,057,849
Incidence rate of overrides per 
1,000 prescriptions filled 
19.42 20.57
 
As seen in Table 2 above, the incidence rate of drug allergy overrides per 1,000 
filled prescriptions rose from 19.42 to 20.57, a percentage increase of 5.9% from the pre 
period to the post period.  The amount of total drug allergy overrides following the KP 
HealthConnect implementation increased by 10.7%. The amount of total prescriptions 
filled following the KP HealthConnect implementation increased by 4.6%. 
A Z-test was calculated in Microsoft Excel at the 95% significance level. The 
formula was as follows: 
, 
 
where proportions and  were the incidence rates for the pre and post 
implementation periods, respectively and n1 and n2 were the total prescriptions for the pre 
and post implementation periods, respectively. Therefore  = 19.42,  = 20.6, n1 = 
1,011,722, n2 = 1,057,849.  The Z-score is then -5.879, with a two-tailed probability of p 
= 0.0002.  The 95% confidence interval formula was as follows: 
. 
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Using Microsoft Excel to calculate, the 95% confidence interval was found to be             
[-1.531, -0.767].  
 The 95% CI [-1.531, -0.767] does not contain zero. Therefore, there is sufficient 
evidence at the 95% confidence level (p = 0.0002) to reject the null hypothesis (H0), 
which states that there is no significant difference between the incidence rate of drug 
allergy overrides when pre and post implementation periods are compared. Since the 
values included in the 95% CI are negative, the direction of the significant effect can be 
inferred as the pre period incidence rate being less than the post period incidence rate (
< ).  
The following chapter will discuss the findings described in the research study 
designed herein, provide recommendations, detail the study’s limitations, discuss 
opportunities for further research, and conclude the study.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 
The incidence rate of drug allergy overrides per 1,000 filled prescriptions rose by 
a statistically significant 5.9% (ρ > 0.0002; 95% CI [-1.53, -.77]) following the 
implementation of KP HealthConnect. The results are surprising. KPGA researchers 
expected a decrease in drug allergy overrides once the EMR was fully implemented. The 
negative values of the 95% CI signified the incidence rate increased post implementation, 
which was the contradictory of the research hypothesis stating the incidence rate of drug 
allergy alerts would decrease following the EMR implementation.  Unfortunately, the 
experience at KPGA may not be comparable or translatable to other KP national facilities 
or non-KP HMO settings in Atlanta.  
Other studies have found drug alert overriding to be a common phenomenon. One 
study showed an increase in override rates from about 50% to 75% during a five-year 
period at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, indicating a declining compliance to safety 
alerts (Abookire et al., 2000). High override rates were observed in drug refills and in 
poorly defined drug allergies (Abookire et al., 2000; Payne et al., 2002; Weingart et al., 
2003; Hsieh et al., 2004). Another recent study found a 69% override drug allergy rate 
and an 88% override rate for drug-drug interaction alerts at the Veterans Administration 
Puget Sound Health Care System in Seattle, WA (Payne et al., 2002).  Similarly, 
Weingart et al. found ambulatory providers at five primary care practices overrode 91% 
of drug-allergy alerts, and 89% of high-severity drug-drug interaction alerts (Weingart et 
al., 2003). Weingart et al. suggested that the threshold for alerting was set too low and 
that CPOE should suppress alerts for drug refills for medications that patients currently 
tolerate.  Heish et al. found 80% drug allergy alerts were overridden in 1,150 patients. 
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Overrides of drug-allergy alerts were common and about 1 in 20 resulted in ADEs, but all 
of the overrides resulting in ADEs appeared clinically justifiable (Heish et al., 2004). 
Although the research design of these studies differed from this current study, the results 
of all suggest that alert overriding was a frequent occurrence and the provider reasons 
behind overriding needed further research. 
In other studies, decision support has improved care with some success (Bates et 
al., 1994; Bates et al., 1999a). Although the following two studies did not specifically 
measure drug allergy alert overrides, it is important to note that decision support has had 
an impact on medication errors and medication safety. Bates et al. (1994) a 55% decrease 
in non-intercepted serious medication errors (ρ = .01). As a secondary outcome, this 
study found a 17% decrease in the preventable ADE rate, which was not statistically 
significant (ρ = .37). Bates et al. (1999a) demonstrated an 81% decrease in medication 
errors and an 86% decrease in non-intercepted serious medication errors (ρ <.001 for 
both). This study found a decrease in the rate of ADEs per 1000 patient-days from 14.7 to 
9.6 during the study (ρ = .09) and a decrease in the number of preventable ADEs from 5 
to 2 (ρ = .05).   
 
Possible reasons for increased incidence rate 
It was not clear from the aggregate data of this study why the incidence rate of 
drug allergy overrides increased following implementation; however, there maybe several 
reasons for the increase.  The challenge of ensuring allergy alerts stemmed from a 
number of factors which may include inaccurate data, highly inclusive alert databases, 
and lack of monitoring of alerts and overrides.  
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Inaccurate data: First, KP HealthConnect, in its infancy, may not contain all the 
possible and available, relevant, and accurate patient information. For example, inpatient 
diagnoses, inpatient medications, and diagnoses from claims databases obtained from 
members who obtain a portion of their care in non-Kaiser Permanente facilities would be 
missed by a drug allergy alert within KP HealthConnect since there was not a system in 
place currently to enter these external data into the patients EMR.  Human error including 
improper allergy data entry may trigger redundant, inappropriate, or conflicting drug 
allergy alerts, and subsequent overrides would ensue. Heish et al found that “Patient does 
not have this allergy/Tolerates” was a common reason given for overrides and accounted 
for nearly a third of drug allergy overrides (Heish et al.,2004). The high incidence of this 
override reason suggests that physicians may often be using the patient's self-report or 
other information at the time of visit to determine if a patient will tolerate the medication. 
Other contributing factors to the use of the override option may be the infrequent 
updating of patients' allergy lists, resulting in many patient records being out of date or 
inaccurate, and the numerous locations where allergies are documented in the chart, often 
with little agreement. Presenting clinicians with inaccurate alerts may erode their faith in 
the system and make it more likely for them to ignore subsequent alerts. 
Highly inclusive alert databases: Highly inclusive drug-classes and cross 
sensitivity knowledge bases can generate a large number of alerts for drugs that only have 
a slight potential to trigger an allergic reaction, causing numerous but justified overrides. 
Abookire et al. and Weingart et al. both found that high override rates were partly 
attributed to alerting protocols that generated alerts as long as the ordered drug was in the 
same family as a drug on the patient's allergy list (Abookire et al., 2000; Weingart et al., 
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2004). Hsieh et al. also found that the majority (90%) of overrides occurred when the two 
drugs belonged to the same family but were not identical (for example, codeine and 
hydromorphone) (Hsieh et al., 2004). 
When the threshold for alerting was set too low, clinicians were inundated with 
alerts of low clinical significance, leading to alert fatigue, high override rates and the 
potential to override even important alerts.  Weingart et al. found that providers were 
more likely to override alerts for renewals compared with new prescriptions (Weingart et 
al., 2003). However, renewals were not included in the data utilized for this study. In 
addition, alert fatigue (described in Chapter II) has been shown to be a critical factor in 
high override rates (Peterson et al., 2001, Magnus et al., 2002).  Redundant, conflicting, 
seemingly unimportant drug allergy alerts can drain the provider’s time and energy, and 
subsequently these alerts will be overridden and ignored. Unfortunately this may lead to 
ignoring critical alerts along with negligible ones. 
 In addition, there is no clear distinction between allergies and sensitivities. 
Allergies are body reactions which involve the entire immune system.  Sensitivities are 
somewhat different body reactions which do not involve parts of the immune system.  
Allergies and sensitivities are very similar in their effects. Either or both can cause any 
symptom ranging from itches, rashes, and minor pains to more complex problems such as 
schizophrenia, depression, ADD/ADHD, obesity and arthritis. Therefore, the difference 
between allergies and sensitivities is unclear and sustaining a standardized allergy list 
becomes difficult.  The balance of critical and superfluous alerts has yet to be 
standardized.  
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Lack of monitoring:  There was a lack of continuous quality improvement 
system, since clinically appropriate and inappropriate overrides were not monitored.  
Drug allergy alerts and override reasons were not examined if decisions by providers and 
pharmacists were deemed appropriate. In the study by Weingart et al., physician 
reviewers judged one-third of generated alerts to be inappropriate (Weingart et al., 2003). 
Similarly, Heish et al. with drug-allergy alerts highlighted that the vast majority of 
allergy alert overrides were clinically appropriate and did not lead to adverse drug events 
(Heish et al., 2004). For example, there were cases where the clinician stated new 
evidence existed for use of the medication despite the displayed contraindication (Heish 
et al., 2004). More broadly, these findings of inaccurate alerts underscore the need to 
keep drug alert knowledge bases up-to-date with current clinical literature to achieve 
more credible alerts. 
Decision support should prevent patients from receiving the wrong drug or the 
wrong dose when prescription errors are made. However, not all errors are caught 
because alerts are not read, are misinterpreted, or are wrongly overridden. In Figure 7, 
van de Sijs et al. schematically elucidates the CPOE process, the management of drug 
safety alerts, and the emergence of medication errors.  
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Figure 7: CPOE process and management of drug safety alerts. 
 
Van de Sijs et al., (2006).J Am Med Inform Assoc. 13(2): 138–147. 
 
Shah et al. found in many instances that although the clinician continued ordering 
an alerted medication, he or she also eliminated the potential contraindication (facilitated 
by the CDSS) by discontinuing the preexisting medication or removing an inaccurate 
diagnosis. Other times, although the contraindication persisted, the alert achieved its 
intended effect by altering clinician behavior (i.e., ordering extra monitoring) (Shah et al., 
2006). Thus, even when a clinician continued ordering an alerted prescription, the alert 
may have appropriately modified subsequent actions, which is important to assess when 
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fully evaluating the impact of a CDSS. Van de Sijs et al. termed this action as “justified 
overriding” (van de Sijs et al., 2006). 
Figure 7 clarifies reasons for “justified overriding” (e.g., when the benefits of the 
drug outweigh the disadvantages of a drug allergy interaction and where the provider can 
knowingly monitor potential ADEs) (Weingart et al., 2003). According to the figure, the 
contrary is true as well; a cancellation or change of a drug order due to a drug allergy 
alert can cause a medication error. Overriding a drug allergy alert is often seen as a 
problem, but it should be emphasized that only unjustified overriding (ignoring alerts, 
misinterpretation, and incorrect selection) poses the problem (van de Sijs et al, 2006).  
Justified overriding may be patient-related or can occur when an alert is based on 
erroneous patient information. Patient-related reasons include, for example, clinically 
insignificant alerts, a limited treatment course, patient tolerance of the medication or dose 
in the past, discussion of potential adverse events with the patient or monitoring thereof, 
absence of a good alternative, and the benefits of the drug outweighing the disadvantages 
(Weingart et al., 2003). Examples of erroneous patient information include inaccurate 
allergy information or medication lists that are out of date, which justify overriding 
(Weingart et al., 2005; Spina et al., 2005). Appropriate alerts can be defined as true 
positive alerts, alerts that are correct and current for the patient at hand. It does not imply 
that appropriate alerts are always perceived as useful.  
 
Theory 
The Social Cognitive Theory was applied and used as a framework for this study. 
The Social Cognitive Theory provides a structure for understanding, predicting, and 
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changing human behavior. The theory identifies human behavior as an interaction of 
personal factors, behavior, and the environment (Bandura, 1986).  
The interaction between the person and behavior involves the influences of a 
person’s thoughts and actions in the theory. The interaction between the person and the 
environment involves human beliefs and cognitive competencies that are developed and 
modified by social influences and structures within the environment. The interaction 
between the environment and behavior involves a person’s behavior determining the 
aspects of their environment and in turn their behavior is modified by that environment. 
The Social Cognitive Theory influenced this study by examining how the newly 
implemented EMR environment influenced the behavior of pharmacists and providers by 
measuring the use of drug allergy overrides. 
Issues of drug allergy alert overriding can be explained with the help of Reason's 
model of accident causation. This model is applicable to complex sociotechnical systems 
that require coordination of a large number of human and technologic elements and 
focuses on person, team, task, workplace, and organization (Reason, 1990; 2000). 
Alerting systems in CPOE are an example of such a complex sociotechnical system.  
Reason differentiates between active failures, error-producing conditions, and 
latent conditions (Reason et al., 1998; Reason 1990; 2000; 2004). Active failures are 
errors (slips, lapses, and mistakes) and violations of an individual having an immediate 
adverse effect. Error-producing conditions are factors that affect performance of 
individuals, thus provoking active failures. These factors can originate in the 
environment, team of care providers, individual, or task at hand. Latent conditions are 
defensive gaps, weaknesses, and absences that are unwittingly created as the result of 
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earlier decisions made by system designers, builders, regulators, and managers. Latent 
conditions can originate from organizational processes or management decisions. 
Reason's model shows that accidents result from a chain of numerous contributing 
factors at different levels: active failures, error-producing conditions, and latent 
conditions, individual and organizational factors. Accidents, medication errors, result 
when there is a simultaneous alignment of gaps (Reason et al., 1998; Reason 1990; 2000; 
2004)  
Figure 8 illustrates how suboptimal decision support can reduce physicians' 
motivation, thus provoking active failures in alert handling.  
Figure 8: Reason's model applied to drug safety alerts in computerized physician 
order entry. 
Van de Sijs et al., (2006).J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2006 Mar–Apr; 13(2): 138–147. 
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Recommendations 
The author believes that effective EMR systems can improve practitioner 
prescribing and reduce medication errors. The study highlighted a number of possible 
improvements to reduce errors. 
Increase usability and decrease workflow interruptions: Developers must 
make it easy for a provider to “do the right thing” and increase the usability of the 
system.  Alerts need to be clear, concise, and easy to navigate.  Feldstein et al. found that 
decision support alerts are followed less often when they appear at inappropriate times in 
workflow, are difficult to read, add to time pressure, and are canceled before being fully 
read (Feldstein et al., 2005). Alerts should include the automatic generation of dialog 
boxes or other means to facilitate clinician actions that will eliminate drug 
contraindications (e.g., discontinuing pre-existing medications or inappropriate 
diagnoses) or will implement recommended monitoring (e.g., ordering laboratory tests). 
In addition, improving the maintenance of patients' allergy lists could be accomplished by 
having clinicians select override reasons from a menu of choices; selection of reasons 
such as “Patient does not have this allergy/Tolerates” or “Patient taking already” from the 
menu would automatically prompt the clinician to remove the drug from the allergy list.  
The alert burden should be reduced by presenting providers with only the most 
clinically relevant contraindications, and providers should only be interrupted for 
contraindications with high clinical severity. Shah et al. found high user acceptance of 
ambulatory computerized prescribing alerts when using a selective knowledge base and 
minimizing workflow interruptions. By implementing tiered alerts (levels of severity), the 
alert burden was limited by assigning 71% of alerts to a non-interruptive display mode. 
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Clinicians accepted the more selective interruptive alerts two-thirds of the time (Shah et 
al., 2006). 
Minimize false positive alerts: Many CDSS use commercial knowledge bases to 
drive their alerting. These knowledge bases are often highly inclusive, placing more 
emphasis on breadth of coverage than on clinical relevancy or severity of adverse events 
(Reichley et al., 2005). However, this approach can have serious consequences. If too 
many alerts are delivered, in addition to missing important alerts, clinicians may refuse 
the application altogether due to disruptions in workflow. When designing knowledge 
bases for CDSS, care must be taken to display alerts judiciously and to maintain the right 
balance between useful alerting and over-alerting (Ash et al, 2004b).  Therefore, testing 
the sensitivity of the drug allergy alerts by verifying that the drug allergy alert is firing 
appropriately and has high clinical severity and relevance is critical to reducing false 
positive alerts. Inaccurate alerts should be reduced by keeping drug alert knowledge 
bases up-to-date with current clinical literature, maintaining accurate clinical 
documentation in electronic medical records, and creating optimal linkage to all 
repositories of patient information.  
National standardization:   Two levels of standardization need to exist: a 
standardized national knowledge base and standardized pharmacist and provider input.  
To address the issue of alert fatigue and failure to recognize potentially important 
alerts, organizations can customize alerts for their local sites. However, this 
customization process is complex and time-consuming and requires obtaining consensus 
from the medical staff and the pharmacy. As a consequence, alerts might not be 
standardized across the country or even across health care enterprises. The creation of a 
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customized knowledge base that all alert databases derive from requires substantial 
institutional resources. Since not all organizations can devote needed resources, a central 
repository of knowledge base information should be created for public sharing.  Without 
a national plan or standards, each insurer could promote its own EMR that is 
incompatible with others. 
There is currently also a lack of standardization of actions from providers and 
pharmacists for drug allergy alert overrides.  A set menu of options facilitating 
appropriate prescribing (e.g., correcting an error in the patient’s allergy list) and a 
standardized list of override reasons should be available to providers and pharmacists. 
These menu options should encourage that best practices are followed in every drug 
allergy alert and that all override reasons are captured for future research.  
For each organization included in NCQA's various report cards, a certain number 
of stars appear in each category which that organization was evaluated. These stars reflect 
how well an organization performed against the standards and/or measures in that 
category. HMOs are evaluated in the five categories of Access and Service, Qualified 
Providers, Staying Healthy, Getting Better and Living with Illness. For HMO/POS plans, 
4 stars indicated the highest level of performance in a category.  Currently KPGA has 
obtained an “Excellent” accreditation standing from NCQA (NCQA, 2005).  However, 
there are no specific requirements that regard the monitoring of drug allergy alerts or 
overrides. Adding drug allergy alerts and override monitoring to the NCQA’s standard 
requirements will only strengthen the struggle to reduce medication errors.  
Resistance to change is ubiquitous in health care. Incentives by the federal 
government to providers and pharmacists alike, which are essential human components of 
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the EMR system, are necessary. Provider and pharmacist performance may be suboptimal 
due to heavy workloads and incorrect or lack of identification of only clinically 
significant preventable drug allergy alerts. Any electronic alert system will only be 
effective if both the providers and pharmacists both collaborate to respond to drug allergy 
alerts. Therefore, incentive based performance can provide the impetus to manage drug 
allergy alerts well. These potential incentives include:  
1. Pay for performance: Rather than paying for care by the piecework method 
(fee-for-service) or using administered price arrangements (for example, daily 
rates, fee schedules and capitation), reimbursement should be linked at least in 
part to adherence to safety and quality measures. (e.g., the percentage of patients 
questioned about allergic drug reactions would result in a fiduciary reward, or a 
certain percentage of inappropriate overrides would result in disciplinary action)  
2. Specific consideration and compensation for the extra time and effort involved 
in managing drug allergy alerts. 
Continuous improvement and monitoring: Maintaining the knowledge within 
the system and managing the individual pieces of the system are critical to successful 
delivery of decision support. Continuous monitoring by tracking the frequency of alerts 
and user responses and evaluating the resulting reports on a regular basis is a necessary 
step to improving medication safety. Thus, if it becomes clear that a drug-drug or drug-
allergy interaction is appearing suddenly tens of times per day yet is always being 
overridden, an appropriate corrective action can be taken.  
An override reason should be required input, enabling pharmacists and nurses 
downstream in the medication order process to see not only that the ordering physician 
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has considered the risk of drug allergy but also understand the reason why the physician 
felt it was safe to override the alert. Furthermore, modifying the override reason field so 
that physicians pick from a menu of choices enables automatic updating of the patient's 
allergy history—if the reason chosen is, for example, that the patient tolerates the drug 
well or is already taking the medication at home. The override reasons provide 
information that help us better understand why certain alerts are not accepted, and 
therefore to potentially modify the alerting strategy. This study shows the importance of 
analyzing override reasons as a quality improvement tool to improve alerting strategies, 
and organizations should consider making this part of their routine improvement 
processes after implementing CPOE. 
Clinician override reasons should be validated before changes to an alert 
knowledge base are made. There are occurrences where clinicians override the alerts 
without providing a reason. While these instances are a lost opportunity to understand the 
clinician's reason for override, we recognize that these omissions may occasionally be 
necessary for clinical expediency. Given the potential value of this information for future 
alert improvement, CDSS should be designed to most effortlessly capture the reason for 
clinician overrides and minimize omissions of override reasons. 
Although clinicians may not cancel an order for an alerted medication order, their 
subsequent actions may eliminate the potential contraindication. These actions represent 
an acceptance of alert recommendations and should be assessed when evaluating the 
impact of a CDSS.  
It is also critical to keep up with the pace of change of medical knowledge. A 
possible solution could be to assign each area of decision support (e.g., drug-drug, drug-
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allergy, preventative reminders) to an individual, and requiring an assessment 
periodically to ensure that the knowledge base remains applicable. However, the effort 
required to monitor and address issues in EMR systems is considerable and is easy to 
underestimate.  
Because a CDSS system can mitigate most but not all prescribing errors, the 
clinical pharmacist involvement in the medication use process, as well as a CPOE system 
with advanced clinical decision support, is vital for improving medication safety. A well 
trained and capable provider can manage drug allergy alerts within the CPOE tool and 
can act accordingly. Pharmacists are the last line of defense against inappropriate 
prescribing and drug use in the ambulatory setting. 
In addition, the federal government should conduct safety studies to evaluate the 
effectiveness of its recommendations and of medical procedures in general. Continuous 
quality improvement to ensure appropriate alerting is critical for continued efficacy and 
acceptance of CPOE decision support. Evaluation is necessary through KP, federal 
government agencies, and other research entities to verify that these alerts are firing 
appropriately. 
 
Limitations and Further Research 
This study design includes limitations that merit discussion. Because our data was 
limited to the aggregate number of drug allergy overrides and prescriptions filled, it was 
only able to provide a generic snapshot of the incidence rates of drug allergy overrides. 
Justified overriding could not be established as a possible reason of the increase of the 
incidence rate post implementation. Also, the study was not able to consider alert 
effectiveness based on the role of the provider. Data was not available on the provider’s 
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response to the CPOE drug allergy alerts (e.g., whether the provider cancelled, changed, 
or overrode the orders and override reasons).  Thus, PIMS drug allergy override data was 
used as the numerator in the calculation of the comparative incidence rates for the pre and 
post implementation periods. More detailed data may have discovered provider ordering 
behavior, specific facility tendencies, patient demographic trends, and a specialty 
department comparison. Further research is needed to explore the potential patterns in 
these groups of drug allergy overriding behavior.  
Another limitation is that the definitional logic or rules that triggered allergy alerts 
in PIMS or KP HealthConnect were not available for comparison of the pre and post 
periods. Further research is needed to verify the logic or rules were the consistent for both 
periods.  
Also, the study took place within an HMO primary care setting, thus the results 
may not be generalizable to other medical practice settings (e.g., nursing homes, 
hospitals, private practices) or specialty ambulatory care. Specifics will vary depending 
upon the type of EMR utilized and the provider culture and organizational structure. Also 
these results may not be generalizable to other outpatient settings where pharmacists do 
not play such an active role in medication safety.  
 Finally, the data utilized in this research study was specific only to the KPGA 
region. Including Georgia, KP facilities include 431 medical offices in California 
(Northern and Southern regions), Colorado, Hawaii, Mid-Atlantic States (Washington 
D.C., suburban Maryland, northern Virginia, and Baltimore), Ohio, Oregon, and 
Washington.  Data from these other regions were not available to compare the findings 
from this research study. Further research is needed to investigate if the results are similar 
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to other KP facilities across the United States. Along the same lines, similar HMO 
settings or settings with comparable EMR systems within the Atlanta area were not 
available for assessment for this study. Further research is needed to evaluate these other 
settings to verify regional trends within other outpatient, inpatient, and long term care 
settings. Other KP national regions and non-KP, local settings can utilize this study 
design outlined herein to compare the impact of EMR implementations on drug allergy 
overrides.  
While electronically generated clinician reminders have proved effective in 
multiple clinical settings, only limited information exists about why clinicians often fail 
to follow computer-generated advice. Questions exist regarding the most effective ways 
to deliver reminders and decision support advice. Additional research is needed to begin 
to consider how information should be organized and delivered, how patients can become 
involved, what role patient-managed records should play, and how communication 
between providers and patients can be improved. Research investment is essential if we 
want to improve the way evidence is provided at the point of care. 
 
Conclusion 
Electronic medical records provide many benefits. Decision support in CPOE has 
been shown to improve medication safety by providing alerts to physicians of potentially 
dangerous drug allergy interactions.  This study evaluated the impact of an EMR 
implementation on drug allergy overrides and found an increased incidence of alert 
overrides following the implementation.  As a result, healthcare settings (ambulatory, 
hospital, long term care, etc.) should use caution when designing decision support 
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systems and should include continuous monitoring of drug allergy alerts to contribute to a 
successful implementation.  Also, evaluation of drug allergy override reasons could aid in 
alerting systems gaining their full potential and improvement of medication errors.   
Implementing an EMR system with an integrated CDSS is a difficult undertaking, 
and while it does not solve the entire medication safety problem, it is an important piece 
of the puzzle, and real improvements in the medication use and drug allergy process can 
be realized.   
The question still remains as to where the optimal specificity for alerts lies. A safe 
alerting system has high specificity and sensitivity, presents clear information, does not 
unnecessarily disrupt workflow, and facilitates safe and efficient handling. More research 
is needed to find the optimal balance between over and under alerting.  Also future larger, 
more prolonged studies can help to determine the full relationship between automated 
alerts for drug allergy interactions and the related outcomes of ADEs. 
In summary, more study is needed to understand which healthcare quality 
problems are best suited to remedy by computerized intervention and which system 
designs are most successful in achieving behavioral change. 
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